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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 12-4157 
_____________ 
 
RICHARD MCDONALD, 
                         Appellant 
 
v. 
 
PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE; COLONEL FRANK PAWLOWSKI, 
Commissioner of Pennsylvania State Police in his official capacity; 
MAJOR JOHN GALLAHER, in his individual capacity 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 (D.C. Civil No. 2-09-cv-00442) 
District Judge:  Honorable Terrence F. McVerry  
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 12, 2013 
____________ 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., SHWARTZ and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: August 9, 2013) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 Richard McDonald appeals the October 31, 2012 Order of the District Court 
granting summary judgment in favor of the Pennsylvania State Police and Colonel Frank 
 2 
Pawlowski on McDonald’s claims of disability discrimination under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.1 and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 
U.S.C. § 794.  What is before us emanates from a December 2002 work-related 
automobile accident in which McDonald was injured.  The parties and their counsel are 
familiar with the extensive factual and procedural history that has brought us to this point 
these many years later, a history which, it is undisputed, has been accurately set forth by 
the District Court in the Opinion we now review, and need not be reprised here.  Suffice 
it to say that, on remand from an earlier appeal to this Court, the District Court held, inter 
alia, that no reasonable jury could conclude that McDonald has an actual disability, and 
that there was no evidence that MPOETC regarded him as disabled. 
 McDonald does not argue before us that he has an actual disability; indeed, he 
concedes he does not.  Rather, the dispute before us centers on whether the District Court 
erred in concluding, on summary judgment, that the MPOETC did not regard him as 
having a disability when it denied the certification he was seeking, i.e. that it did not 
perceive him as substantially limited in his ability to perform a major life activity.   
 We exercise plenary review over a district court’s grant of summary judgment, 
viewing all evidence in favor of the non-moving party and drawing all reasonable 
                                                 
1
  The ADA, and its definition of disability, was amended in 2008, with the amendments 
effective on January 1, 2009.  ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 
Stat. 3553 (2008).  Because Congress did not provide for retroactive application of the 
amendments and because the alleged discriminatory conduct here occurred prior to 
January 1, 2009, we analyze McDonald’s ADA claim under the pre-amendment version 
of the statute.  The parties have not suggested that we should do otherwise or, that with 
one exception not relevant here, the substantive standards for liability under the ADA and 
the Rehabilitation Act are not the same.  
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inferences in his or her favor.  See Powell v. Symons, 680 F.3d 301, 306 (3d Cir. 2012); 
Albright v. Virtue, 273 F.3d 564, 570 & n.6 (3d Cir. 2001); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(a). 
 We have carefully considered the record in this case, the controlling law, and the 
arguments of counsel.  We conclude, following our review, that we will affirm the order 
of the District Court.  Although we will affirm the order, we cannot help but observe that 
certain issues addressed by the Court are not free from doubt—the extent of the deference 
accorded the MPOETC and the Court’s commentary on whether a “regarded as” claim is 
viable under Title II, e.g., come to mind.  At the end of the day, however, we are satisfied 
that there was no evidence that MPOETC regarded McDonald as disabled because of any 
physical or cognitive limitation when it denied his application for certification as a 
municipal police officer as opposed to simply regarding him as unfit for certification 
because of the potential side effects from his use of Avinza, a medically prescribed 
narcotic pain reliever. Given this conclusion, we need not reach the several other issues 
and sub-issues raised on appeal.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
